University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2016

Blurred Lines: Public School Reforms and the Privatization of
Public Education
Erika K. Wilson
University of North Carolina School of Law, wilsonek@email.unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: Washington University Journal of Law & Policy
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Blurred Lines: Public School Reforms and the
Privatization of Public Education
Erika K. Wilson*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 190
I. THE DECLINE OF THE JUDICIAL REMEDIES AS AN EFFECTIVE
MECHANISM FOR REFORMING PUBLIC SCHOOLS....................... 196
A. The Limits of Public School Reform Through Federal
Court School Desegregation Remedies ........................... 197
B. The Limits of School Reform Through School Finance
Litigation ......................................................................... 203
II. THE RISE OF MARKET-BASED REFORMS ....................................... 208
A. Choice as Reform................................................................ 209
1. Vouchers .................................................................... 211
2. Charter Schools .......................................................... 212
3. School-District-Wide School Choice Programs ......... 213
B. Quality Public Education as a Private Good ..................... 214
1. Private and Public Goods: An Operational
Definition ................................................................... 215
2. Market-Based Reforms Combined Situate Public
Education as a Private Good ...................................... 217
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF QUALITY PUBLIC EDUCATION AS A
PRIVATE GOOD............................................................................ 221
A. Normative Shift in Our Conceptualization of Public
Education ........................................................................ 221
1. Democracy Rationale ................................................. 222
2. Social Mobility Rationale .......................................... 224
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A.,
University of Sothern California; J.D., UCLA School of Law. For comments and feedback on
the thoughts and ideas expressed in this Article, I am grateful to Barbara Fedders, Audrey
McFarlane, Patience Crowder, Jaime Lee, and Kathryn Sabbeth.

189

190

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 51:189

B. Market-Based Reforms Allow the Social Mobility
Justification for Public Education to Dominate .............. 226
IV. EXPANDING THE REFORM AGENDA: ALTERNATIVES TO
MARKET-BASED REFORMS ......................................................... 229
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 231
INTRODUCTION
Expansive public school reform initiatives are being adopted in
school systems nationwide.1 Most of the reform initiatives are aimed
at improving the public schools attended by predominately poor and
minority students.2 Judicially based reforms are however noticeably
absent from the reform agenda.3 Previously, judicially based reforms
aimed at desegregating schools4 and reforming school finance5 were
the primary mechanisms used to improve educational opportunities
1. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION
MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 9–31 (2013) (discussing and
critiquing the various local, state and federal based school reform efforts in public education
over the course of the last decade).
2. At the federal level in particularly, sweeping legislation aimed at closing achievement
gaps between minority and poor students and their nonminority and middle class counterparts
have been a catalyst for reforms implemented at the state and local level. See, e.g., The No
Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3) (2006) (noting that one purpose of the No Child
Left Behind Act is “closing the achievement gap between high- and low-performing children,
especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers”); The Race to the Top Initiative, Pub.
L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 284 (2009) (enacted as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Race to the Top initiative is a competitive grant program that
provides grants to states that, among other things, implement education reforms, close
achievement gaps, and increase high school graduation rates).
3. See, e.g., Derek Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools and Lessons to Be Learned, 64
FL. L. REV. 1723, 1731–38 (2012) (noting the decline in court orders that address racial
segregation, poverty, disability and language access) [hereinafter Black, Civil Rights]; Erika K.
Wilson, Gentrification and Urban Public School Reforms: The Interest Divergence Dilemma,
118 W. VA. L. REV. 101, 125 (2015) (arguing that “those looking to improve urban public
schools are now more likely to look outside of the federal or state judiciary”) [hereinafter
Wilson, Gentrification].
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of
New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1 (1971).
5. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
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for poor and minority students.6 However, the more recent public
school reform initiatives largely rest upon free-market based tools
such as charter schools, vouchers, and district wide school choice
programs.7 While judicially based reform efforts center around
collectively improving public schools for poor and minority students
as a whole, market-based reforms focus on providing individual
families and students with the opportunity to improve their own
educational opportunities. The shift from collectively-based judicial
reform efforts to individually focused, market-based reforms is
significant for two reasons.
First, it suggests that advocates are accepting of a diminished role
for the judiciary in regulating educational opportunities for poor and
minority students. The federal judiciary has long been the institution
“looked upon to remedy issues of racial segregation and inequality”
in public schools.8 However, since at least the 1990s—and some may
argue even earlier—federal courts have become increasingly hostile
to court mandated desegregation schemes.9 Among other things, the
Supreme Court imposed an arduous causation standard that requires
plaintiffs seeking school desegregation orders to show a connection
between past de jure segregation policies and current school
segregation in order to prevail.10 Plaintiffs often fail to meet this
6. See supra note 3.
7. The term “free-market tools” is used to mean tools that allow for individual parent and
student autonomy, flexibility, and choice. See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE,
POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990) (arguing that the government has failed
to successfully reform schools because government intervention in schools is the problem and
advocating for market based school governance that has parental choice as a foundation);
Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 1083, 1085 (2013) (“In education, racial discrimination and structural inequality are
increasingly ignored as the education system gives broadened ‘options’ to those it underserves,
in the form of private schools, charter schools, and voucher programs.”).
8. Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality Through the No Child Left
Behind Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 628 (2011) [hereinafter
Wilson, Leveling Localism].
9. See, e.g., Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1726 (arguing that “[t]he United States
Supreme Court placed major limitations on desegregation as early as the 1970s and effectively
ensured its end in the 1990s”).
10. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decision-Making: School
Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1646 (2003) (discussing the
high causation standard in school desegregation cases and noting that “plaintiffs are entitled to
their ultimate goal in the lawsuit—desegregation to the extent practicable—but only to the
extent that current segregation is attributable to the defendants”) [hereinafter Parker, Decline].
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arduous standard. Instead, courts routinely find that current racial
segregation in schools is attributable to changing racial demographics
or housing segregation rather than past de jure school desegregation
policies.11 Consequently, modern day racial segregation in schools
often escapes judicial scrutiny or intervention.
Judicial attempts to reform public schools through school finance
reform have achieved mixed results at best. While some state courts
are issuing orders finding that state school financing systems violate
state constitutional provisions regarding a student’s right to an
education,12 the courts tend to take a very limited view of their
remedial authority. They often decline to order remedies that would
require state legislatures to make specific budgetary allocations.13
Instead, they emphasize that judicial intervention in the state
budgeting process is warranted only in very limited circumstances.14
11. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) (“[E]xternal factors beyond the
control of the KCMSD and the State affect minority student achievement. So long as these
external factors are not the result of segregation, they do not figure in the remedial calculus.”);
Thomas Cnty. Branch of the NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340,
1369 (2004) (“While the record in this case establishes that many poor black children in
Thomasville, Georgia are not receiving what this Court would consider an adequate education,
the record is clear that Defendant has not engaged in intentional discrimination based upon
race.”).
12. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W. 2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989)
(finding that Kentucky’s public schools failed to satisfy the state constitutional mandate to
provide an efficient system of public education); Abbott v. Burke 575 A. 2d 359, 384 (N.J.
1990) (holding that the poorer urban school districts in New Jersey did not satisfy the state
constitutional requirement that schools provide students with a thorough and efficient
education). See generally Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity Hollow Victories and
the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative
Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E. 2d 50, 57 (N.Y. 2006)
(reversing the court of appeals directive to the state legislature to calculate the cost of a sound
basic education for New York public school students reasoning that “[t]he role of the courts is
not, as Supreme Court assumed, to determine the best way to calculate the cost of a sound basic
education in New York City schools, but to determine whether the State’s proposed calculation
of that cost is rational”); Hancock v. Commissioner of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005)
(refusing to order a study to assess actual costs of effective implementation of educational
programs intended to provide an adequate education in focus public school districts and,
therefore, finding that the state was not violating the Massachusetts education clause by not
providing an adequate education to students).
14. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E. 2d at 56 (“Judicial intervention
in the state budget ‘may be invoked only in the narrowest of instances’.”); Neely v. WestOrange Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 785 (Tex. 2005) (finding that the
system of school financing did not violate the education provision of the Texas state
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As a result, state legislatures are often left with wide discretion to
craft funding schemes, and all too often those schemes are
insufficient at remedying funding disparities and inadequacies.15
Second, the shift from court-based to market-based reforms
demonstrates a structural change in our conceptualization of the
purpose of public education. From the inception of public education
in America, the states’ primary justification for providing free
education to its citizenry was to produce a robust, literate citizenry
that was not only capable of earning a living, but more importantly,
capable of contributing to and participating in the American
democracy.16 Market-based school reforms such as charter schools,
vouchers, and some school choice programs invert that logic by
allowing individual parents and students with the political capital to
do so to leave their assigned public school and to attend a public or
private school that they believe can provide a higher quality
education. The reforms do nothing to address the state of public
schools more broadly. Rather than focusing on the collective benefits
of public education for the citizenry as a whole, market-based
reforms focus on the ability of particular parents and students to
control educational opportunities by moving away from failing
schools to better performing schools.17
This Article critically examines the rise of market-based reforms.
It argues that market-based reforms result in quality public education
being normatively conceptualized and treated as what political
constitution and reasoning that “[i]f the Legislature’s choices are informed by guiding rules and
principles properly related to public education—that is, if the choices are not arbitrary—then
the system does not violate the constitutional provision”).
15. See Laurie Reynolds, Skyboxes Schools: Public Education As Private Luxury, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 755 (2004) (arguing that even when state legislature increase funding for
all public schools, most school funding legislation does not place a cap on how much districts
can spend on students thereby allowing wealthier districts to continue to drastically outspend
poorer districts).
16. See Julie A. Reuben, Patriotic Purposes: Public Schools and the Education of
Citizens, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 2–3 (Susan Furham & Marvin Lazersons eds., 2005).
17. See, e.g., Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1729 (noting that parents who select
charter schools desire self-determination and the power to control their own children’s
educational interests with little regard for the educational health of the charter school as a whole
and describing the purposes of government’s involvement in providing public education as
being for patriotic or democracy building purposes). See infra Part I for a further and more
thorough discussion of the purposes of public education in America.
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economists call a private, rather than public, good.18 To be clear, this
Article uses the classic definition of a “public good” to mean a good
that is “non-excludable” and “non-rivalrous.”19 On the other hand, it
uses the term “private good” to mean a good that is both excludable
and rivalrous.20
While public education is admittedly not a pure public good, it is
widely recognized as a “quasi” or “impure” public good because of
the ability to exclude people from receiving it.21 Quasi or impure
public goods share some characteristics of a private good, but are still
considered public goods because there are positive externalities
associated with the good—such that not all benefits of the good
accrue solely to the individual, but instead to society as a whole.22
Market-based school reform efforts often diminish public
education’s ability to truly bring positive externalities to society as a
whole. They do so by situating the positive externalities associated
18. Other legal scholars have also written about the ways in which the purpose of public
education is being skewed due to an influx of market based principles and a trend towards
privatization. See, e.g., John A. Powell, The Tensions Between Integration and School Reform,
28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 671–80 (2001) (arguing that a reformist agenda based
principles of choice that are tied to market-based philosophies is taking root and critiquing that
choice based movement on the grounds that it allows public education to be commodified in
ways that are harmful to African-American students); Derek W. Black, Charter Schools,
Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445, 446 (2013) (suggesting that the
influx of voucher and charter programs as a vehicle for reforming public schools results in a
“commodification of education [that] corresponds with our overall cultural shift toward
individualized, rather than common, experiences”) [hereinafter Black, Charter Schools]. This
Article adds to and builds upon that prior scholarship.
19. See Randall G. Holcombe, A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods, 10 REV.
AUSTRIAN ECON. 1, 1–2 (1997). “[P]ublic good, as defined by economic theory, is a good that,
once produced, can be consumed by an additional consumer at no additional cost.” Id. Further
the term “non-excludable” means that it is difficult to keep people from consuming a good once
it has been produced while the term “non-rivalrous” means that once a good is produced for one
person, additional consumers can consume at no additional cost. Id.
20. See Dennis Epple & Richard E. Ramono, Public Provision of Private Goods, 104 J.
POL. ECON. 57 (1996).
21. John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher
Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 229, 236 (2016) (“Education is a primary example in the economics
literature of a ‘quasi-public good’—a good that, although not strictly speaking a nonrivalrous,
non-excludable classic public good, still has such substantial positive externalities and spillover
effects as to be within government’s purview.”); Christopher Lubienski, Public Schools in
Marketized Environments: Shifting Incentives and Unintended Consequences of Competition‐
Based Educational Reforms, 111:4 AM. J. EDUC. 470 (Aug. 2005) (describing public education
as a quasi-public good.).
22. See Holcombe, supra note 19; Brooks, supra note 21.
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with a quality public education23 in ways that do not benefit the
greater society. Instead, they allow a shallow subset of people to take
advantage of market-like exchanges to select—rather than be
assigned to—a particular school that they believe will provide a
quality public education for only them. Little regard is given to the
overall quality of education received by students collectively. Instead,
market-based reforms allow students to individually improve their
own lot, while failing to address systemic issues that plague many
failing schools. For these reasons, this Article makes a normative
argument in favor of re-thinking market-based reforms as the primary
vehicle for improving educational opportunities for poor and minority
students.
Part I of the Article examines the decline of federal and state
courts in effectively regulating educational opportunities for poor and
minority students. It analyzes the reasons school desegregation and
school finance cases fell short in their quest to effectively reform
public schools for those students. Part II chronicles the rise in marketbased reforms. It then argues that the rise in market-based reform
efforts allows a quality public education to be normatively
conceptualized as a private good rather than a public good. Part III
considers the import of conceptualizing a quality public education as
a private good rather than a public good. Part IV concludes by
suggesting alternative non-market based educational reform models
that should be considered in order to re-conceptualize public
education as a public rather than private good.
23. This Article uses the term “quality public education” to mean: (i) being educated in
environments that are safe and protective; (ii) content that is reflected in relevant criteria and
allows for the acquisition of basic skills in literacy, numeracy and more importantly the
acquisition of critical thinking skills; and (iii) outcomes that demonstrate knowledge and
mastery of skills. See generally THE INT’L WORKING GRP. ON EDUC., UNICEF, DEFINING
QUALITY IN EDUCATION (June 2000), available at http://www.unicef.org/education/files/
QualityEducation.PDF (the aforementioned criteria are three of five criteria suggestions by
UNICEF as constituting a quality education).
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I. THE DECLINE OF THE JUDICIAL REMEDIES AS AN EFFECTIVE
MECHANISM FOR REFORMING PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Scholars, commentators, and advocates often suggest that
American public schools, particularly public schools that serve high
numbers of poor and minority students, are in need of serious
reform.24 The basis for their claim lies in the fact that white, AfricanAmerican, and Latino students often attend schools that are
significantly segregated by race.25 For African-American and Latino
students, they not only attend schools that are segregated by race, but
that also have high levels of students living in poverty.26 The
combination of racial segregation and high levels of students living in
poverty makes it difficult for those schools to provide a high-quality
education.27
Nevertheless, the number of racially-segregated schools with high
poverty levels providing sub-par education to students is only
increasing.28 The reasons for this are manifold; but an important one
24. See, e.g., RAVITCH, supra note 1, at 55 (noting that those seeking to reform public
schools rely heavily on the argument that “public schools are failing and that Black and
Hispanic students must be liberated from public schools”); Michael Heise, The Courts,
Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 633, 643
(2002) (analyzing public school reform effort and noting that “markedly few serious scholars
dissent from the proposition that many urban public schools confront substantial challenges in
their efforts to serve their students, many of whom are members of minority groups or come
from low-income households or both”).
25. See GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 18–19 (May
15, 2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integrationand-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-future/Brown-at-60051814.pdf (describing the high levels of racial segregation in urban or central city schools for
Black and Latino students).
26. Id. at 15–16.
27. Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 410–11 (2012) (“A small but highprofile contingent of predominantly poor and minority schools defy the odds and achieve at
high levels . . . [b]ut delivering a quality education to students under these circumstances can
cost far more per pupil than it otherwise would.”) [hereinafter Black, Middle-Income]; Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts’
Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2003) (“By any measure, predominately minority schools
are not equal in their resources or their quality.”).
28. See generally GARY ORFIELD, GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & JOHN KUCSERA, THE
UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT SORTING OUT DEEPENING CONFUSION ON SEGREGATION
TRENDS (Mar. 2014), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/sorting-out-deepening-confusion-on-segregation-trends/Segregation-
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is that the institution long looked upon to improve schools for poor
and minority students—the judiciary—has had limited success over
the last forty years in doing so.29 This part examines the decline in the
effectiveness of the judiciary in reforming public schools through
school desegregation and school finance remedies.
A. The Limits of Public School Reform Through Federal Court
School Desegregation Remedies
For much of the mid-to-late twentieth century, attempts at
equalizing public education opportunities for minority students were
made through the federal judiciary. This was particularly true of
federal school desegregation remedies.30 This part provides a brief
overview and analysis of why federal court school desegregation
remedies ultimately floundered as an effective vehicle in providing
equal educational opportunities to minority students.
When the Supreme Court declared racially-segregated schools
unconstitutional, the Court recognized the ways in which raciallysegregated schools impede the ability of minority students to obtain a
quality education.31 Yet in the immediate aftermath of Brown v.
Board of Education, the Court was slow to require schools to take
meaningful steps towards desegregating.32 It was not until the late
Trends-Dispute-CRP-Researchers.pdf (arguing that segregation and inequality in public schools
is increasing rather than decreasing).
29. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown:
Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated
Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 833–37 (2010) (describing how the Supreme Court’s school
desegregation jurisprudence reconstitutionalized racially segregated schools and failed to
remedy inferior schools).
30. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111
YALE L.J. 2043, 2052–58 (2002) (analyzing federal court decisions attempting to desegregate
public schools).
31. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v.
Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (“Segregation of white and colored children
in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when
it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a
child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to (retard) the
educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.”).
32. See Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 1603 (noting that the court failed to do enough in
the years after Brown to hasten desegregation and highlighting the fact that the Court in Brown

198

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 51:189

1960s that the Court became more aggressive in its mandate that
schools desegregate. Among other things, the Court required schools
to take affirmative steps, such as enacting race conscious plans for
assigning students to schools, implementing racial quotas to ensure
racial balance in schools, and bussing students.33 To be sure, those
aggressive measures towards desegregation were initially effective.
Public schools, in the South, where most of the federal court
desegregation orders were put into place, ultimately became the most
desegregated schools in the country.34 For a brief period,
desegregation of schools was seen as an effective method for
reforming the public school system for all—and particularly for
minority—students.35
Despite the initial success engendered by the school desegregation
cases, the Supreme Court’s subsequent school desegregation
jurisprudence suffered from two critical shortcomings that would go
on to substantially impede the federal judiciary’s ability to effectively
address racial segregation in schools.36 First, the Court upheld the
“did not even order the Topeka Board of Education to admit Linda Brown to a segregated
school”).
33. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (requiring
schools to take affirmative steps to dismantle segregated schools); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (allowing for racial quotas and busing as
measures to desegregate schools).
34. ORFIELD & FRANKENBERG, supra note 25, at 8–11, 18.
35. Id. at 39 (“[T]here is also a mounting body of evidence indicating that desegregated
schools are linked to profound benefits for all children. In terms of social outcomes, racially
integrated educational contexts provide students of all races with the opportunity to learn and
work with children from a range of backgrounds. These settings foster critical thinking skills
that are increasingly important in our multiracial society—skills that help students understand a
variety of different perspectives.”).
36. As other scholars have noted, the Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence
was never a model of clarity or cohesiveness and this in part has contributed to the inability of
school desegregation remedies to effectively address racial segregation in schools. See, e.g.,
Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status
Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1109
(1990) (“One of the intractable problems of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area of de
jure segregation has been its inability to articulate a coherent theory of the constitutional harm
resulting from de jure segregation of public schools that justifies desegregation as the principal
means to eliminate the harm.”). The two shortcomings that I argue diminished the effectiveness
of school desegregation remedies are not the only shortcomings but are instead, I suggest, the
most salient.
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sanctity of local control and school district boundary lines.37 In doing
so, the Court narrowly interpreted the scope of the judiciary’s
authority to remedy racial segregation between suburban and urban
school districts. Importantly, in most urban cities, especially outside
of the south, segregation in schools is caused by residential racial
segregation between the suburbs and urban cities rather than de jure
school segregation policies.38 Indeed, inter-district segregation rather
than intra-district segregation is the most prevalent form of school
segregation today.39 As a result, in order to effectively use a judicial
remedy to desegregate schools in any meaningful way, especially
outside of the south, courts would have to issue a school
desegregation order between multiple school districts, not just within
a single school district.
Unfortunately, the possibility of a court issuing such a
desegregation order was for all practical purposes foreclosed by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I).40 There,
the Court found that a federal district court could not order an interdistrict school desegregation plan between a suburban Detroit school
37. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (upholding the
constitutionality of a local property tax system of school financing system that resulted in
unequal funding between school districts, reasoning that local control of school finance is
important because it would result in “experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition
for educational excellence”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740–41 (1974) (declining to
issue an inter-district school desegregation order reasoning that “[n]o single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local
autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and
support for public schools and to quality of the educational process”).
38. It is important to note however, that residential segregation between the suburbs and
urban cities was very much caused by explicit federal, state, and local policies. Yet the Supreme
Court does not recognize this state action as sufficient to trigger court mandated school
desegregation orders. See generally Wilson, Leveling Localism, supra note 8, at 649–51 (2011)
(analyzing the ways in which explicit government policies caused racial residential segregation
in the suburbs and urban cities).
39. See AMY STUART WELLS, CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INSTITUTE FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE, BOUNDARY CROSSING FOR DIVERSITY, EQUITY AND ACHIEVEMENT: INTER-DISTRICT
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 1 (Nov. 2009), available at
http://www.onenationindivisible.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Wells_BoundaryCrossing.pdf
(noting that “a full 84% of racial/ethnic segregation in U.S. public schools occurs between and
not within school districts”); Erika K. Wilson, Towards a Theory of Equitable Federated
Regionalism in Public Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1437–39 (2014) (describing how the
combination of metropolitan fragmentation and residential segregation leads to intense
segregation between rather than within school districts) [hereinafter Wilson, Regionalism].
40. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741.
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system and the city of Detroit school system unless there was proof
of an inter-district violation.41 Put another way, the Court in Milliken
I required proof that “racially discriminatory acts of one or more
school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district”
before it would issue and inter-district desegregation order.42 In
coming to this conclusion the Court reasoned that “traditions of local
control of schools, together with the difficulty of a judicially
supervised restructuring of local administration of schools, render
improper and inequitable such an inter-district response to a
constitutional violation found to have occurred only within a single
school district.”43
The standard for issuing an inter-district desegregation order set
forth by the Court in Milliken I is a very difficult standard to meet. In
fact, only a handful of courts have ordered an inter-district
desegregation since the Court’s decision in Milliken I.44 By affording
such weight to local control of schools and school district boundary
lines, even in the face of racial segregation, the Court made it
difficult to reach the most common type of segregation—inter-district
segregation.45 To be sure, the Court’s focus in Milliken I on the
primacy of local control and the sanctity of school district boundary
lines is a key reason that school desegregation remedies are limited in
the effect.
The Supreme Court also compromised the efficacy of school
desegregation by imposing an arduous causation requirement in
41. Id. at 741–43.
42. Id. at 745.
43. Id. at 755.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980)
(finding that Indiana intentionally discriminated through its drawing of municipal boundary
lines, that such discrimination had the effect of causing racial segregation between school
districts, and ordering an interdistrict school desegregation decree); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that the State of
Arkansas intentionally created racially segregated housing conditions which in turn contributed
to segregation between school districts and that an inter-district desegregation decree was
warranted); Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding
that an inter-district school desegregation order was appropriate where school district boundary
lines in Kentucky were previously ignored for the purpose of maintain segregated schools);
Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming an inter-district desegregation order
where there was evidence of inter-district de jure school segregation)
45. See STUART WELLS, supra note 39.
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school desegregation cases.46 In these cases, plaintiffs must show a
causal connection between past state-mandated school segregation
policies and the segregation that exists in schools today, in order to
obtain or sustain a federal court desegregation order.47 This causation
standard is a stark departure from the Court’s previous plaintifffriendly causation standards.
Initially, in Keyes v. School District No. 1 the Court afforded
plaintiffs a generous causation presumption that made it relatively
easy for them to show a connection between past segregation in
schools and existing racial segregation in schools.48 In Keyes, one of
the first desegregation cases to reach the Supreme Court outside of
the South, the Court was asked to decide the appropriate legal to
apply standard when examining segregation in schools that was the
result of de facto rather than de jure school segregation.49 The Court
held that if a plaintiff could establish that intentional discrimination
was the cause of a substantial portion of segregation in a school
district, they were entitled to a presumption that intentional
discrimination was the cause of all other segregation within the
school district.50 Under this presumption, causation between state
action and the segregation that existed in schools was essentially
presumed to exist.51
The Keyes presumption was critical to the early success enjoyed
by school desegregation plaintiffs. It “reflected either a belief, or
perhaps a value, that absent defendant's illegal actions, racial equality
would exist in our public schools . . . [and] [a]ny racial disparity was
presumed to have been caused by defendant, not by private forces.”52
46. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992).
47. Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1731 (arguing that “[t]he centrality of causation to
the fall of educational claims is most obvious in school desegregation”).
48. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
49. Id. at 192.
50. Id. at 208.
51. See Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157,
1170 (1999–2000) (noting that in the Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence,
initially, “proximate cause played only a minimal role in school desegregation . . . [d]efendants
were generally held responsible for all disparities, and little attention was paid to defining the
precise effects caused by the violation”) [hereinafter Parker, Desegregation].
52. Id.
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Over time, however, the Keyes presumption was either not applied at
all or when it was applied, it was substantially weakened.
For example, in Milliken I, the Court declined to apply the Keyes
presumption at all despite clear evidence that state-sponsored
segregation led to substantial segregation in the urban Detroit school
district.53 In fact, the court in Milliken I did not even mention the
Keyes presumption. In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, the
Court did apply the Keyes presumption, but the Court required the
plaintiffs to show the “incremental segregative effects” that de jure
school assignment policies had on the student population of a school,
and to compare it to what the population of the school would have
been in the absence of the segregative effect of the de jure
assignment policy.54 Importantly, the Court then noted that federal
courts could only order a remedy designed to address the difference
between what the student population would have been in the absence
of the de jure assignment policy and what it was as a result of the de
jure assignment policy.55
Subsequent Supreme Court cases continued to ratchet up the
causation requirement for plaintiffs while loosening it for defendants.
For example, in Freeman v. Pitts the Court held that the Keyes
presumption could essentially be rebutted by a defendant school
district through a showing that demographic changes or residential
segregation was responsible for segregation in schools.56 The ruling
in Freeman made it even more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain or
sustain school desegregation orders while simultaneously making it
easier for defendants to escape liability.57
53. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (acknowledging the record before the
district court contained “evidence of de jure segregated conditions only in the Detroit schools”).
54. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977).
55. Id.
56. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992) (“[T]he de jure violation becomes more
remote in time and these demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current
racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure system. The causal link
between current conditions and the prior violation is even more attenuated if the school district
has demonstrated its good faith.”).
57. See Parker, Desegregation, supra note 51, at 1178 (arguing that “the Court has
steadily increased the viability of proximate cause as a limit on the reach of school
desegregation litigation by accepting racial segregation and disparities”).
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In sum, the preference for local control of public education, along
with the heightened causation standard in school desegregation cases,
played a significant role in limiting the effectiveness of the federal
judiciary in addressing racial segregation in schools.58 While some
schools are still operating under school desegregation orders, many
school districts have been released from federal court supervision.59
Further, even when school districts remain under federal court
desegregation orders, due to shifting racial demographics, the school
districts remain segregated by race.60 For those reasons, the efficacy
of judicially based reform of public schools through school
desegregation orders continues to decline significantly.
B. The Limits of School Reform Through School Finance Litigation
Another way in which judicial reform of public schools is
attempted is through school finance reform litigation. Those who
seek reform of schools through school finance litigation do so under a
theory that students—particularly students in predominately
minority-attended, urban public schools—are performing very poorly
academically and that an infusion of more financial resources into the
schools will help improve their academic performance.61 While the
accuracy of this theory is subject to much debate, it is the driving
force behind attempts to reform urban schools through school finance
litigation.62
58. See, e.g., Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1737–38 (“[T]he retreat from
presumption regarding causation ultimately marked the end of mandatory desegregation and
allowed resegregation to take its place.”).
59. Parker, Decline, supra note 10, at 1655 (“Most school districts have been declared
fully unitary . . . .”).
60. See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE
LAW 208–09 (1995).
61. See Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, Law’s Limits, and Urban School Reform
Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1451 (2007) (noting that two assumptions underpin school
finance lawsuits-that school quality is best understood in terms of student achievement and that
student academic achievement is a function of spending).
62. The debate regarding the importance of school funding to academic achievement is
complex and nuanced. Some commentators suggest that increased funding to schools does not
correlate with increased academic performance while others take the opposite view. See, e.g.,
Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 423, 425 (1991) (arguing that “there is no systematic relationship between school
expenditures and student performance. . . . Legal arguments and policy decisions that allegedly
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Putting aside the question of whether or not there is indeed a link
between school funding and academic achievement, scholars and
commentators often find that predominantly poor and minority urban
schools receive less funding than more affluent, typically
predominantly white suburban schools.63 That is the case because a
major component of school funding is local property taxes.64 Urban
school districts tend to be located in poorer areas that are able to
collect fewer local property taxes; consequently, urban school
districts typically allocate less local funding to schools than more
affluent, typically suburban districts.65
This system of funding schools through local property taxes was
initially challenged in federal court as violating the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause.66 Advocates alleged that all
children were entitled to have the same amount of money spent on
their education but that local property taxation schemes for funding
schools resulted in students in poorer districts having less money
spent on them than students in more affluent districts in violation of
the U.S. Constitution.67 However, the Supreme Court ultimately
rejected this argument and instead found that there is no fundamental
right to an education under the Constitution and that local property
advance educational equity are suspect if based on the conventional assumptions about
expenditure variations.”); Marta Elliott, School Finance and Opportunities to Learn: Does
Money Well Spent Enhance Students’ Achievement?, 71 SOC. EDUC. 223, 233 (1998) (finding
that “per-pupil expenditures indirectly increase students’ achievement by giving them access to
educated teachers who use effective pedagogies in the classroom”).
63. See, e.g., Black, Middile-Income, supra note 27, at 374 (“[P]redominantly poor and
minority schools routinely receive thousands of dollars less per pupil than their suburban
counterparts.”); Gillian B. White, The Data Are Damning: How Race Influences School
Funding, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/
09/public-school-funding-and-the-role-of-race/408085/ (examining research showing that in
Pennsylvania, “districts that have a higher proportion of white students get substantially higher
funding than districts that have more minority students”).
64. Wilson, Regionalism, supra note 39, at 1444–45 (describing the ways in which school
districts are funding through the levying of property taxes on all of the properties that lie within
the school district’s boundaries).
65. Id. at 1444–45 (“School districts that encompass higher valued property can
levy taxes at a lower rate yet still collect large sums of money while school districts that
encompass lower valued property must levy taxes at a higher rate but still collect less money,
thereby allowing fiscal disparities between districts to persist.”).
66. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
67. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 601–04 (1994).
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tax funding schemes were rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose.68
After being rejected by the Supreme Court, school funding
advocates next turned to state constitutions to make claims for equal
funding of schools.69 They did so under two different theories. The
first theory was an equity theory—that local property funding
schemes were unconstitutional under state constitutions because they
violated provisions in state constitutions specifically enumerating a
right to an education.70 Under this theory, advocates challenged perpupil spending disparities between districts as violating state
constitutions on state equal protection grounds and sought parity in
per-pupil expenditures between districts.71
The second theory was an adequacy theory—that the quality of
education students in urban school districts was inadequate and
therefore violated state constitutional provisions regarding a right to
an education.72 In adequacy challenges to systems of school funding,
plaintiffs essentially asked courts to “compel the state to do more
than simply open up schools and demand student attendance; . . . [but
to] ensure that some meaningful level of education is offered in the
schools.”73 More often than not plaintiffs seeking to reform schools
through pleading both equity and adequacy theories of relief.74
Equity and adequacy based school finance reform efforts are
achieving mixed success, with adequacy claims often proving more
successful that equity claims.75 Yet neither equity nor adequacy
68. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 1.
69. See Thro, supra note 67.
70. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (challenging constitutionality
of New Jersey school funding statutes on the grounds that they discriminated against students in
area with low property tax rates under the New Jersey constitution); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d
929 (Cal. 1976) (finding that the California local property taxation for funding schools violated
the California constitution equal protection clause); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v.
State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (finding the Washington system of local property taxation to
fund schools unconstitutional under the Washington state constitution).
71. Thro, supra note 67, at 600–01.
72. Id. at 601–02.
73. See Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1206 (2011).
74. Id. at 1207 (“[A]dequacy claims are typically raised alongside equity arguments
. . . .”).
75. Id. at 1208.
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claims have come close to effectively reforming public schools
attended by predominately poor and minority students for a number
of reasons. Three fundamental reasons for the limited success of
school finance litigation in reforming urban public schools are worth
highlighting.
First, school finance lawsuits in general are premised upon the
idea that academic achievement is an appropriate barometer for
whether a school is providing quality education and that increasing
funding to public schools will increase students’ academic
achievement.76 This is a specious claim that over time has proved
increasingly faulty. The variables that ultimately influence a student’s
academic achievement are manifold and do not always correlate
precisely with the type of education that the student is being
provided. Indeed, research suggests that factors outside of school,
such as family environment, access to quality pre-school, and other
intangible social environment factors, influence a student’s academic
achievement more so than the particular school they attend.77 Further,
owing in part to the success of both equity and access claims, some
urban schools receive more in funding per-pupil than non-urban
districts.78 Yet the increased funding has not overhauled urban
student achievement.79
Second, adequacy claims have found some success, but they
grapple with appropriately defining and measuring what it means to
provide an “adequate” education.80 Adequacy lawsuits are often
premised on language in state constitutions that require the state to
provide a certain kind of education to students such as “thorough” or
“efficient.” Courts facing adequacy-based cases struggle to determine
what constitutes an "adequate" education, leading to a variety of
76. See Tang, supra note 73, at 1211–13.
77. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 22–
23 (1966) (finding a higher correlation between student achievement and non-school based
factors); Heise, supra note 61, at 1458 (“To the extent that such variables as familial
interactions (or lack thereof), poverty, diet, and home stability are among the set of variables
that influence student achievement and are not surmountable by whatever positive influence a
school can muster, then an already difficult litigation task becomes virtually impossible.”).
78. Heise, supra note 61, at 1447.
79. Id. at 1450.
80. Tang, supra note 73, at 1207–08 (noting that the difficulties and methods that judges
in adequacy suits use to determine what constitutes an adequate education).
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opinions and remedies.81 Importantly, with adequacy cases,
legitimate separation of powers concerns exist, because state
constitutions often contain specific language that delegates the task of
developing a system of school financing to the state legislature.82 For
that reason, there is often great deference given to state legislatures to
determine how much and how to spend money to ensure an
“adequate” education.83 Even when courts are ambitious in defining
what constitutes a constitutionally adequate education, the road to
implementation can be complex, arduous and often left to the whims
of the various state legislatures.84 Thus, judicially based adequacy
remedies often suffer from a lack of consistency across jurisdictions
as to what constitutes a constitutionally adequate education, and how
much money state legislatures are actually willing to spend to ensure
that students receive an “adequate” education. To that end, adequacy
suits have at best achieved mixed results, depending upon the
jurisdiction.
Finally, even when states have the political will and energy to
make substantial changes, funding disparities still persist between
wealthy and non-wealthy school districts, primarily due to the
infusion of private money in wealthy districts that goes beyond state
81. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (finding that the North
Carolina state constitution guaranteed every child an opportunity to receive a sound basic
education in our public schools and outlining specific academic skills that would meet that
criteria); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 187 Misc. 2d 1, 11, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 475, 483 (Sup.
Ct. 2001) (finding that the system of education in New York violated the state constitution but
noting that under the state constitution a “state of the art” education is not required; rather all
that is required is an education that instills students with the skills they need to become
productive citizens).
82. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 56 (R.I. 1995) (grappling with
the appropriateness of the court weighing in on school finance questions and noting that “[t]he
education clause leaves all such determinations to the General Assembly’s broad discretion to
adopt the means it deems ‘necessary and proper’ in complying with the constitutional
directive”).
83. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 187 Misc. 2d at 77 (“The choice of measures
designed to remedy the constitutional violation described herein lies in the first instance with
the State Legislature informed by the expertise of the Governor, SED, BOE and the Regents. At
this juncture, the court does not prescribe the precise spending measures that must be taken.”).
84. See generally Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy: Looking Backward
and Forward Through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R & C.L. 411 (2008) (describing
New Jersey’s Abbott litigation and the road to achieving an adequate education in New Jersey).

208

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 51:189

allocations of funds.85 States for the most part do not stop wealthy
districts from spending above and beyond minimal state allocations.86
To be sure, even if they did, it is not guaranteed that reducing funding
disparities between wealthy and non-wealthy districts would actually
improve the educational opportunities for students in less affluent
districts. For these reasons, school finance litigation is not a
completely effective mechanism for reforming school systems,
particularly urban school systems.
II. THE RISE OF MARKET-BASED REFORMS
As a consequence of the shortcomings of school desegregation
litigation and school finance litigation discussed in the previous part,
efforts to reform public schools—particularly public schools with
large numbers of poor and minority students—do not prominently
feature in litigation-based reform strategies. Instead, there continues
to be a great deal of debate regarding the efficacy of litigation-based
school reform strategies in general,87 and more specifically, the
institutional competency of courts to solve the complex issues
inherent to issues of public school reform.88 To that end, much of the
recent debate around school reform is focused outside of the courts.
While lawsuits challenging the sufficiency of urban education are
still ongoing,89 the predominant forms of school reform for poor and
minority students are related to ensuring that they have more choice
85. See generally John Schomberg, Equity v. Autonomy: The Problems of Private
Donations to Public Schools, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 143 (1998) (chronicling the equity
problems that can occur when more affluent schools accept parental donations and how such
donations can have the effect of nullifying state attempts to create funding parity between
school districts).
86. See Reynolds, supra note 15, at 759 (“[I]n most states, school districts retain the
ability to set their own upper limits on spending. Though statutory reform may push up the
bottom to ensure that all districts receive at least a certain minimum level of per-pupil dollars,
only a few states have dared to limit the expenditures at the top.”).
87. See, e.g., Ryan & Heise, supra note 30, at 654–56 (describing the difficulties posed by
courts attempting to reform schools through school finance litigation).
88. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES,
AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 138–41 (2011).
89. See, e.g., Teresa Watanbee, Compton Unified Sued for Allegedly Failing to Address
Trauma-Affected Students, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/
la-me-ln-trauma-school-lawsuit-20150518-story.html.
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in where they go to school.90 This part suggests that market-based
reforms such as charter schools, vouchers, and other school-choice
related programs are now the primary reform mechanisms while
reform-based litigation plays a much less prominent role. It outlines
the rise of market-based reforms and argues that market-based
reforms allow public education to be conceptualized as private good
rather than a public good.
A. Choice as Reform
Students are typically assigned to public schools in accordance
with where they live.91 As a result, the demographics of schools and
school districts for the most part mirror the demographics of the
neighborhoods and localities in which they are located.92 To the
extent those neighborhoods and localities are racially and
economically segregated, public schools are as well.93 The harms of
racially and economically segregated schools are well documented.94
In order to ameliorate the harms of racially segregated and
underfunded schools, judicially-based public school reform efforts
often attempt to disrupt the strong tie between school and municipal
boundary lines that all too often leads to schools being racially
segregated and underfunded.95 Indeed, as Professors James Ryan and
Michael Heise observed:
90. See, e.g., Karla Scoon Reid, Minority Parents Quietly Embrace School Choice,
EDUCATION WEEK (Dec. 5, 2001), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2001/12/05/14intro
minority.h21.html (noting that “[m]any minority parents are impatient at what they see as the
plodding pace of school reform; they’re concerned that their own children won’t benefit from
long-term improvements to the current public school system”).
91. See Wilson, Leveling Localism, supra note 8, at 627 (“[S]chool district boundary lines
are drawn so that students for the most part attend schools in close proximity to where they
live.”).
92. See Wilson, Regionalism, supra note 39, at 1438–39.
93. Id.
94. Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos, and Unequal
Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION 53, 53–55 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996).
95. See Ryan & Heise, supra 30, at 2050 (noting that both school desegregation and
school finance reform “sought to equalize opportunities by erasing boundaries, whether
physical or financial, that separated schools and school districts”).
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To a very real extent, both school desegregation and school
finance reform pitted equality of opportunity against local
control regarding student attendance and finances. Put
differently, desegregation and school finance reform often
threatened the concept of the traditional neighborhood school
attended only by local students and paid for primarily by local
residents who could devote as much money to their “own”
schools as they wished.96
Yet, as described in Part I, school desegregation and school finance
reform efforts achieved only limited success in challenging the public
education local control paradigm. In many ways, Supreme Court
decisions like Milliken I reified rather than disrupted the sanctity of
local control over schools.97 As a result, a concerted push outside the
judicial system to change the ways in which students are assigned to
schools emerged as an alternative to judicial remedies for improving
educational opportunities for poor and minority students.98
Importantly, the quest to change the way in which students are
assigned to schools is undergirded by the idea that infusing more
choice into the school assignment process will both improve the
options available to individual students and spur competition between
schools that improves the public school system as a whole.99 This
approach to school assignment is undoubtedly a relic of free-market
principles.100 Proponents of choice-based reform suggest that infusing
more choice into the public school system will breed competition by
schools for students.101 This competition will allow parents to choose
which school they want their children to attend, which will in turn
incentivize schools to provide high quality public education so that
96. Ryan & Heise, supra note 30, at 2050–51.
97. Id. at 2046–52.
98. Id. at 2051 (“The core principle of school choice is an equitable one, as school choice
grants poorer students an opportunity—the chance to choose their own schools—that is now
reserved for wealthier students.”).
99. Black, Charter Schools, supra note 18, at 458 (“Those favoring an individualized
concept of education argue that the absence of competition in the traditional public school
system is the weakness that stymies its progress. For them, it is the marketplace and the
competition it brings that would force schools to be responsive to individuals.”).
100. Henry M. Levin, Education as a Public and Private Goods, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 628, 629 (1987).
101. Id.
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parents will choose their school for their children.102 It will also give
students the opportunity to select the school that best meets their
needs.103
Conceptually, the idea that such a free-market approach is
appropriate for the dissemination of public education was rooted in
the Supreme Court’s decision in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters.104
There, the Court found that parents have a liberty interest in
controlling the way in which their children are raised and upheld
parents’ rights to opt out of the public school system and send their
children to a private school.105 While the Court’s holding in Pierce
paved the way for the proliferation of private schools that exists
today, the Court’s reasoning in Pierce is now being extrapolated to
justify choice-based public school reform.106 The choice-based public
school reform movement consists of vouchers, charter schools, and
various school-district-wide choice programs. Each of these choicebased reform programs is discussed in-turn.
1. Vouchers
Voucher programs allow public tax dollars to be given to parents
to use to pay tuition at private schools.107 To date, at least fourteen
states and the District of Columbia have adopted voucher
programs.108 Many of the voucher programs are limited to students
who are poor and/or attending a school that is deemed failing or
performing poorly.109 Notably, the amount of funding offered by each
102. Id.
103. See id. at 636.
104. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
105. Id.
106. See Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination,
99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1093 (2013) (“Using the ‘constitutional values’ articulated in Pierce,
proponents of choice justify market and public choice as expressions of the moral and legal
right of parents to leave the school system.”).
107. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 30, at 2078.
108. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SCHOOL VOUCHER LAWS: STATE-BYSTATE COMPARISON (Jan. 2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/StateBy
StateVoucherComparison.pdf; Fast Facts on School Choice, EDCHOICE http://www.edchoice.
org/our-resources/fast-facts/ (last modified Aug. 22, 2016).
109. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 108. For example,
Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina and Ohio all limit their voucher programs to poor
students and/or students attending failing schools.
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of the voucher programs is relatively modest.110 As a result, vouchers
are typically used at moderately priced religious schools rather than
the more elite religious or secular schools.111 While voucher
programs remain rather limited in their scope, they are proliferating,
and states increasingly view them as a viable alternative to reforming
public education for poor and minority students.112
2. Charter Schools
Charter schools are publicly funded schools that are run by private
persons or corporations.113 Students are not required to pay tuition to
attend charter schools.114 Charter schools are exempt from most state
rules and regulations and in exchange are required to meet certain
performance accountability standards.115 Charter schools are seen as
an attractive alternative to traditional public schools precisely
because they are not required to adhere to state rules and
regulations.116 Indeed, because they are not required to meet certain
state rules and regulations, charter schools are often conceptualized
as being innovative and able to enact rules such as longer work days
for teachers in order to meet the special needs of poor and minority
students.117 In school systems serving large numbers of poor and
110. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 108. Most of the
voucher programs are limited to the state-level per-pupil expenditures.
111. See James, supra note 7, at 1095.
112. KATHERINE CIERNIAK ET AL., CTR. FOR EVALUATION & EDUC. POLICY, MAPPING THE
GROWTH OF STATEWIDE VOUCHER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (Mar. 2015),
available at http://ceep.indiana.edu/projects/PDF/Statewide_Vouchers_CEEP_EPB.pdf (noting
that “[t]he number and scope of statewide voucher programs targeting students from lowincome households (and/in some cases attending poorly performing schools) have expanded
quickly in recent years”).
113. See Thomas A. Kelley III, North Carolina Charter Schools’ (Non-?) Compliance with
State and Federal Nonprofit Law, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757, 1767 (2015).
114. Id.
115. See James, supra note 7, at 1096; Kelley III, supra note 113, at 1767.
116. See Kelly III, supra note 113, at 1767 (“To allow for innovation, charter schools are
exempt from most of the rules, regulations, and statutes that apply to other public schools.”);
PUB. SCHS. FIRST N.C., THE FACTS ON CHARTER SCHOOLS (2013), available at
http://www.publicschoolsfirstnc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/PSFNC-Charter-School-FactSheet.pdf (chronicling the ways in which charter schools are exempt from regulations and
statutes in North Carolina that apply to other North Carolina public schools).
117. For example, schools like the Harlem Success Academy and the KIPP schools often
cite to their status as charter schools that are not required to adhere to the same formalities as
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minority students, charter schools have grown so much that in many
instances they either approximate or exceed the number of traditional
public schools in the school district.118
3. School-District-Wide School Choice Programs
School-district-wide choice programs offer another way in which
choice is infused into public education as a means of reforming
public schools. Such programs allow students to elect out of the
school they are assigned to attend according to their address. Instead,
district-wide choice programs allow students to attend another
traditional public school outside of their assigned neighborhood
school.119 They may also attempt to create more diversity,
particularly to attract more white students, by establishing magnet
schools- schools that offer specialized instruction in a particular
area.120 The majority of these programs are intra-district, meaning
traditional public schools as the reasons for their success. See, e.g., Alexandria Neason, Charter
Schools Latest Innovation: Keeping Teachers Happy, SLATE MAGAZINE (Apr. 27, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/schooled/2015/04/27/charter_schools_and_churn_and_burn_how_
they_re_trying_to_hold_on_to_teachers.html; Kate Taylor, At Success Academy Charter
Schools, High Test Scores and Polarizing Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/nyregion/at-success-academy-charter-schools-polarizingmethods-and-superior-results.html?_r=0 (describing the tactics that make Harlem success
academy uses to achieve results such as teachers working twelve hour days and public
disclosure of students test results in order to shame the students into performing better).
118. See, e.g., Michael Allison Chandler, Enrollment Up in DC Public Schools for the
Seventh Consecutive Year, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/enrollment-up-in-dc-public-schools-for-seventh-consecutive-year/2015/10/20/
84ef94ec-7742-11e5-bc80-9091021aeb69_story.html (noting that in Washington D.C. “Charter
schools continue to serve about 44 percent of the city’s public schools”); Alan Greenblatt, New
Orleans District Moves to an All Charter System, NPR.ORG (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.npr.
org/sections/ed/2014/05/30/317374739/new-orleans-district-moves-to-an-all-charter-system
(describing the shift in the predominately poor and minority school system in New Orleans to
an all charter system of schools).
119. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., CREATING STRONG DISTRICT CHOICE PROGRAMS
(May 2004), available at https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/choiceprograms/report.pdf
(describing the various types of district wide choice programs, including open-enrollment
which allows parents to choose any school within a school district and specially themed magnet
schools).
120. Christine Rossell, Whatever Happened to Magnet Schools? No Longer Famous But
Still Intact, EDUC. NEXT (Spring 2005), available at http://educationnext.org/files/ednext
20052_44.pdf (describing magnet schools as being created in order to “draw white students to
predominantly black schools by offering a special education with a focus on a particular aspect
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that students can only exercise choice within the district, not between
districts, thereby severely limiting the number of truly viable options
for students in predominately poor and minority school districts.121
Nevertheless, school-district-wide choice programs are also often
conceptualized as a means of improving educational options for poor
and minority students.122
B. Quality Public Education as a Private Good
The aforementioned market-based reforms have achieved varying
success in improving educational opportunities for individual
students.123 Yet the reforms do not improve the public education
system as a whole. Choice-based market reforms are premised on the
idea that certain schools are inadequate and students should be able to
leave those schools for greener pastures. The reforms do nothing to
improve the inadequate schools that students are leaving behind. To
the contrary, a rich body of literature suggests that market-based
reforms only make the schools left behind worse.124
of the curriculum, such as performing arts, or Montessori, or advanced math, science, and
technology”).
121. Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 800–01 (2005) (describing the widespread availability of intra-district
choice programs and noting that “there are few meaningful options for public
school choice within district boundaries in inner-city school systems”).
122. Id. at 800.
123. See, e.g., Susan Dynarski, Urban Charter Schools Often Succeed. Suburban Ones
Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/upshot/a-suburbanurban-divide-in-charter-school-success-rates.html (finding that “[i]n urban areas, where
students are overwhelmingly low-achieving, poor and nonwhite, charter schools tend to do
better than other public schools in improving student achievement”); Matthew M. Cringos &
Paul E. Peterson, A Generation of School Voucher Success, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444184704577585582150808386 (“[A] study
shows that an African-American student who was able to use a voucher to attend a private
school was 24% more likely to enroll in college than an African-American student who didn’t
win a voucher lottery.”).
124. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG, GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & JIA WANG, CHOICE
WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
STANDARDS (Jan. 2010), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/choice-without-equity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity2010.pdf (finding that charter schools are increasing racial segregation in schools); CTR. FOR
RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY 82 (2013), available at
http://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013%20Final%20Draft.pdf
(finding
that
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Importantly, market-based reforms like vouchers, quality charter
schools, and slots in quality public choice programs are in limited
supply.125 Thus, poor and minority students trapped in failing schools
must compete with one another for even the chance to achieve
improved educational opportunities. This part argues that
combination of these two forces results in public education being
conceptualized as a private rather than public good. The part first
provides an operational definition of public and private goods. It then
makes the argument that market-based reforms, combined with
localist public education governance structures, are situating public
education as a private rather than public good.
1. Private and Public Goods: An Operational Definition
Public goods theory lays a theoretical foundation for how much of
a particular good the government should supply.126 In theorizing how
much of a particular good the government should supply, public
goods theory characterizes goods as either public goods or private
goods. Public goods are goods that are non-excludable and nonrivalrous.127 Non-excludable “means that it is difficult to keep people
from consuming the good once it has been produced.”128 Nonrivalrous means that that once the good is produced it can be
consumed by an additional person at no additional cost.129 On the
other hand, private goods are rivalrous and excludable, meaning one
person’s consumption of the good precludes another person from
consuming the good and that the good can only be consumed by an
additional person at an additional cost.130 Examples of public goods
include highways and national defense; once these goods are
students in charter schools perform similar to or worse than students in traditional public
schools).
125. See, e.g., Kyle Spencer, School Choice Is No Cure All, Harlem Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2012) (describing the limited supply of high quality magnet and charter schools
available in Harlem, N.Y.).
126. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV
ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954); RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 143–239 (2d ed. 1996).
127. Holcombe, supra note 19, at 1.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. at 1, 2.
130. Samuelson, supra note 126, at 387–89.
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produced it is not practically feasible to stop others from enjoying
those goods, and an additional person’s consumption of the good
does not add additional costs.131 Examples of private goods include
goods such as food and clothing.
Some theorists suggest that goods with one or both of the
characteristics of a public good (e.g., non-rivalrous or nonexcludable) should be produced by the government because it is more
efficient for the government to produce such goods.132 They further
suggest that this is the case because there is lack of an incentive for
the private market to produce goods that have one or both
characteristics of a public good.133 Thus, a key component of goods
that have one or more characteristics of a public good is that the state
needs to provide it in order to ensure an appropriate or optimal
allocation of the good.134 On the other hand, goods that are
characterized as private goods are thought to be optimally allocated
or provided through private markets, because the profits will motivate
appropriate and optimal allocation of the goods through the private
market.135
Importantly, education is neither a pure public or private good. It
is instead an impure or quasi-public good.136 Impure or quasi-public
goods are goods that contain some characteristics of public goods and
some characteristics of private goods.137 Education it is considered an
impure-public good because the possibility of excludability exists.138
131.
132.
133.
134.

Holcombe, supra note 19, at 2–3.
Samuelson, supra note 126, at 387–89.
Id.
See DAVID BRIDGES & TERENCE H. MCLAUGHLIN, EDUCATION AND THE MARKET
PLACE 139 (1996) (“Public goods will be underprovided without state intervention.”). To be
sure, there is much debate as to whether the state must always produce goods that have one or
more characteristics of a public good. The private market has provided and is capable in some
instances of providing certain types of public goods. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright
and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 643 (2007)
(“What began as a framework for determining the proper scope of public expenditure has
evolved into a technical term of art that is no longer coterminous with goods that must be
provided by the government.”).
135. Samuelson, supra note 126, at 387–89.
136. Brooks, supra note 21; Lubienski, supra note 21.
137. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 126, at 9.
138. For example, you could exclude students from receiving a specific type of education
by requiring that they pay tuition or requiring that they live in a certain area in order to obtain
the education. Education in charter schools is also often limited by weighted lottery systems.
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Yet for reasons having to do with pragmatics and government
legitimacy, public education continues to be produced by state
governments.139 Indeed, despite education being an impure public
good, the state provides public education because of the large number
of positive externalities that public education provides. Those
positive externalities include “benefits to the community or society at
large . . . in terms of equality of opportunity, social cohesion,
democratic benefits, law and order, economic growth” for which “the
external benefits or costs are likely to be available to all with zero
marginal costs.”140 Thus, because of the aforementioned positive
externalities associated with education it is considered an impure or
quasi-public good which justifies the state providing it.
As argued in the next part however, the infusion of market-based
reforms threatens to push the way that we conceptualize public
education further away from that of an impure public good and closer
to that of a private good. Such a shift has important implications for
the level of public education that the state will then be willing to
provide. It also has important implications for the ability of the most
vulnerable members of the public education marketplace—poor and
minority students—to receive a quality public education.
2. Market-Based Reforms Combined Situate Public Education as
a Private Good
The current slate of reforms situates public education, particularly
for poor and minority students, closer to that of a private good. They
do so in two ways: first by emphasizing the individual benefits of
public education rather than the collective benefits of public
education, and second by shifting the responsibility for obtaining a
quality public education from the state to parents and students. With
respect to the emphasis on individual rather than collective benefits,
the rationale for charters, vouchers and certain school-district-wide
choice programs is premised upon the idea that individual students
See generally Katie Ash, Weighted Admissions Lotteries: Will They Reshape Charter
Demographics, EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/03/
18/26charterlottery.h33.html.
139. BRIDGES & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 134, at 143.
140. Id.
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and parents should be able to improve their own lot by moving to a
better performing school. The reforms do not attempt to address the
problems with the schools that students are leaving behind. Instead,
the market-based rationale for these reforms merely presumes that the
prospect of students exiting poorly performing schools will spur
competition and force those schools to improve.141
Yet the premise that competition will improve the poorly
performing schools is faulty. In fact, in most states, state money
follows students. Therefore, when students leave traditional public
schools for a charter school, a voucher program, or a better public
school through a school choice program, the public school that the
student would have attended loses some or all of the state per-pupil
allotment that the school would have received if the student
remained.142 While proponents of market-based reforms contend that
the public schools are not worse off, because they still receive the
same amount of local money to educate fewer students,143 there is
room for debate as to whether the local money is sufficient in and of
itself, particularly since many of the students left behind in the
traditional public schools have greater needs.144 Further, aside from
141. See supra Part II.A.
142. See generally Preston C. Green III et al., Having It Both Ways: How Charter Schools
Try to Obtain Funding of Public Schools and the Autonomy of Private Schools, 63 EMORY L.J.
303 (2013) (describing the ways in which charter schools receive public funding); Julie F.
Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling: Examining Voucher
Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703, 706
(2015) (noting that “in voucher programs, the funds flow directly from state coffers to parents
in the form of a voucher that can only be spent at a private school participating in the
program”).
143. See generally Valerie Strauss, Separating Fact From Fiction: 21 Claims About
Charter Schools, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2015/02/28/separating-fact-from-fiction-in-21-claims-about-charter-schools/; Michael
McShane, School Choice Critics Try to Have it Both Ways, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 8,
2015), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/2015/09/08/school-choice-critics-tryto-have-it-both-ways (“[A]lmost every program in the country allows only a fraction of a
student’s per-pupil allotment to follow that student. For example, in Indiana, the voucher for
low-income students is capped at 90 percent of the state’s contribution toward a child’s
education. All of the locally raised tax dollars stay in the traditional public school system.”).
144. See, e.g., Recent Cases, State Constitutional Law—Education Clause—Florida
Supreme Court Declares State’s School Voucher Program Unconstitutional—Bush v. Holmes,
919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2007) (describing the impact of
market-based reforms such as vouchers on traditional public schools and noting that “the
children left behind will be distinctly underprivileged in ways that will keep them in failing
public schools being drained not only of funds, but also of their best students”).
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money, few changes occur at poorly performing schools; instead
poorly performing schools are likely to be closed down and the
remaining students transferred to marginally better or equivalent
public schools.145
Moreover, that market-based reforms emphasize the individual,
rather than collective, benefits of public education is evident in the
limited supply of market-based reforms. For example, while there is a
proliferation of charter schools, the number of high quality charter
schools, particularly in school districts serving predominantly poor
and minority students, is limited.146 Similarly, voucher programs are
limited in the amount that they will pay which limits the ability of
students using vouchers to attend more expensive and higher quality
private schools.147 District-wide school choice programs also have
limited number of slots for the high quality and most sought after
schools.148 This results in the enactment of tools such as lotteries for
slots in the better charter schools or magnet schools.149 In the end,
145. Wilson, Gentrification, supra note 3, at 134–37.
146. See CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES (CREDO), STANFORD UNIV.,
MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 1 (2009), available at
http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf (“Nearly half of the
charter schools nationwide have results that are no different from the local public school
options and over a third, 37 percent, deliver learning results that are significantly worse than
their student would have realized had they remained in traditional public schools.”); Dylan P.
Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency, Accountability, and Success, 41
J.L. & EDUC. 513, 514 (2012) (“[E]mpirical data reveal that there is inconsistent quality in the
charter school sector. The results show that, in fact, charter schools may not be increasing the
academic achievement of the children they serve when compared with traditional public
schools.”).
147. See, e.g., Brittany Bronson, Why Vouchers Won’t Fix Vegas Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/opinion/why-vouchers-wont-fix-vegasschools.html (noting that “[p]rivate school tuition in Nevada can be as high as $12,000, and the
biggest problem with the vouchers is that the poorest families will be unable to make up the
difference”).
148. See, e.g., Marlon A. Walker, Parents Frustrated with DeKalb Magnet School Lottery,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (June 6, 2015), http://www.myajc.com/news/news/local-education/parentsfrustrated-with-dekalb-magnet-school-lotte/nmWPc/ (noting a parent’s frustration with magnet
lottery school system and the parent indicating “[d]emand is more than supply, and the county
has not done a thing about it. It’s no longer about merit. It’s about luck”).
149. See, e.g., Neema Roshania, Philly Families Face High-Stakes Hunt for Prized Charter
Lottery Slots, NETWORKS.ORG. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/
nw-philadelphia/79420-philly-families-face-high-stakes-hunt-for-prized-charter-school-lotteryslots (chronicling the story of a family trying to win a coveted seat in a Philadelphia charter
school through a lottery process).

220

Journal of Law & Policy

[Vol. 51:189

students and families are left to scrap for a seat in a high-quality
school, though most will fail to gain admission. Given the limited
number of slots available for high-quality charter or magnet schools
and the limited reach of voucher programs, a quality public education
becomes rivalrous in that one student’s gain is another’s loss.
Individual students may obtain some gains, but collectively the
options available to students are not better. Collectively, students
may in fact be worse off.
The second way in which market-based reforms bring public
education closer to conceptualization as a private, rather than a
public, good is that it shifts our understanding of who should be
responsible for ensuring a quality education. As discussed in Part
II.B.1, private goods are those in which optimum allocation occurs
through the private market, not the government. In a nod to the
collective benefits provided by public education, the state provides
public education but the quality varies significantly by locality.150
Prior to the enactment of market-based reforms, public school
reforms aimed at improving education for poor and minority students,
particularly judicially based reforms, placed pressure on the state not
just to provide an education, but to provide a quality education.151
On the other hand, market-based reforms put the onus on parents
and students to affirmatively seek out high quality public
education.152 While the state continues to provide a basic or baseline
education, the state ducks the issue of quality by putting the burden
on parents to escape poorly performing or failing schools. Indeed, the
proliferation of market-based reforms to the exclusion of any other
types of reforms, tacitly allows state retrenchment from the duty of
150. See Wilson, Regionalism, supra note 39, at 1444–45 (noting that the “combination of
fragmentation and localism creates significant disparities between neighboring school districts
within metropolitan areas,” including disparities in the quality of education provided).
151. Black, Charter Schools, supra note 3, at 1736–37.
152. To be sure, in order for students to even take advantage of market-based reforms, it
requires that they or their parents have the social capital that it takes to navigate what is often a
byzantine process of applying for charters, vouchers, or school choice programs. See, e.g.,
Conor Williams, What Applying to Charter Schools Showed Me About Inequality, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/03/whatapplying-to-charter-schools-showed-me-about-inequality/284530/ (describing how parents with
more time and resources can increase their chances of obtaining a coveted spot in the charter
school lottery by applying to more schools and having the ability to stand in line early in the
morning to submit charter applications).
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providing a quality education to students, particularly poor and
minority students. Put another way, market based reforms allow the
state to essentially turn over responsibility for providing a quality
public education to parents and students under the guise that parental
choice that results in a few select students improving the education
they receive is the same as offering quality public education that
benefits the collective good. Poor and minority students whose
parents lack the social capital to navigate the system of school choice
often suffer the most from the state retrenchment of providing
wholesale quality public education.153
In sum, market-based reforms focus on the individual rather than
collective benefits of public education. They also shift the
responsibility for obtaining a quality public education from the state
to students and parents. As a result, quality public education is now in
many ways an excludable good distributed through private-market
like exchanges. This in turn results in public education being situated
closer to a private good than a public good. As discussed in the part
that follows, situating a quality public education as a private good has
implications for how we normatively conceptualize public education
that in turn leads to distributional inequalities that harm poor and
minority students.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF QUALITY PUBLIC EDUCATION AS A
PRIVATE GOOD
A. Normative Shift in Our Conceptualization of Public Education
An important consequence of market-based reforms is that they
are causing a seismic shift in the ways in which public education is
normatively conceptualized. Throughout the history of public
education in America, two competing normative justifications for
public education have existed, the first rooted in principles of
democracy and the second rooted in principles related to social
153. See, e.g., Valerie Lee, Educational Choices: The Stratifying Effect of Selecting
Schools and Courses, 2 EDUC. POL’Y 125, 137–38 (June 1993) (noting that there is little
evidence to suggest that low quality schools close down as advocates of school choice suggest
but that instead low quality schools remain and continue to serve the students whose parents
lacked the motivation or interest in choosing a higher quality school).
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mobility or social advantage.154 As described in the parts that follow,
situating public education as a private rather than public good
diminishes the democracy-related justifications for public education
and allows the social mobility justification for public education to
dominate. Such a shift in our normative conception of the
justification for public education causes harm to the most vulnerable:
poor and minority students.
1. Democracy Rationale
For much of the history of American public education, the
democracy rationale for public education played a larger role than the
social mobility justification.155 For example, during the American
colonial period, public education was seen as necessary in order to
indoctrinate residents with religious principles so that they would be
less inclined towards barbarianism and social disorder.156 Indeed, one
of the first pieces of education-related legislation during this period,
the Massachusetts Bay School Law, indicated that people must be
taught to read and write so that they could “obey the laws of God and
the state.”157 Several other laws enacted in colonial Massachusetts
mandating some form of public school for segments of the population
often emphasized that “the good education of children is of singular
benefit to any common-wealth”158 and the importance of ensuring
children’s ability “to read and understand the principles of
religion.”159
The vision of education as being necessary for the health of the
democracy was most prevalent at the start of the 1800s.160 At that
time, it was widely believed that an educated citizenry would allow
154. David F. Labaree, Consuming the Public School, 61 EDUC. THEORY 381 (2011)
[hereinafter Labaree, Consuming].
155. See id.
156. Id. at 382.
157. See THE CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY 68–69 (T.B. Wait & Co. 1814).
158. See Marcus W. Jernegan, Compulsory Education in the American Colonies: I. New
England, 26 SCHOOL REV. 731, 740 n.I (1918).
159. See 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW
ENGLAND 6 (Nathanial B. Shurtleff, M.D. ed., Press of William White 1853).
160. Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Post-Parents Involved Challenge: Confronting
Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1034–35 (2008).
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citizens to cast informed votes and to participate knowingly and
effectively in the democracy.161 To that end, the state established
compulsory education laws and provided citizens with free
education.162 Common school founders such as Horace Mann
envisioned public education as providing crucial citizenship training
functions because they believed that an effective democracy required
citizens with proper civic virtue.163 Common school founders also
believed that public education could provide citizens with a
“common culture and a sense of shared membership in the
community.”164 The common culture and shared sense membership
was seen as necessary to prevent class conflict that was arising from
the growth of capitalism. In that vein, common school founders
believed that public education could serve as the “great equalizer” of
men.165 Thus, the common school founders situated education as
benefiting the public through citizen training and ensuring that all
citizens were equally educated in order to avoid class conflict.166
161. Id.
162. PATRICK J. RYAN, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN AMERICA
256 (1965) (noting that during the 1800s and early 1900s, public education was made available
at no cost by all states. The chief reason compelling the provision of free public education was
that it was seen as undemocratic to require students to pay since “education for citizenship in a
republic was not only a vested right of the individual but also a social obligation”); ALLAN S.
HORLICK, PATRICIANS, PROFESSORS, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN
EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 15 (1994).
163. See David F. Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American Struggle Over
Educational Goals, 34 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 39, 44 (1997) (explaining that early common school
reformers saw citizen training as a key reason to provide public education and quoting Horace
Mann as saying “it is a very laborious thing to make Republicans; and woe to the republic that
rests upon no better foundations than ignorance, selfishness, and passion”) [hereinafter Labaree,
Public Goods].
164. Id. at 45.
165. See Horace Mann, Report for 1848, in ANNUAL REPORTS ON EDUCATION 668–69
(1872) (“Now, surely nothing but universal education can counterwork this tendency to the
domination of capital and the servility of labor. If one class possesses all the wealth and the
education, while the residue of society is ignorant and poor, it matters not by what name the
relation between them may be called: the latter, in fact and in truth, will be the servile
dependents and subjects of the former. But, if education be equably diffused, it will draw
property after it by the strongest of all attractions. . . . Education then, beyond all other devices
of human origin, is a great equalizer of the conditions of men—the balance wheel of the social
machinery.”).
166. See Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 44–45; Frankenberg & Le, supra note
160, at 1034–37. Notably, the common school founders’ vision of equally educating all citizens
did not apply to all demographics of the citizenry. Instead, the vision was limited to “a select
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2. Social Mobility Rationale
The “social mobility” or “social advantage” normative
justification for public education also existed but came to particular
prominence during the late 1800s. At that time, a group of education
reformers led by elite members of society believed that “education
had to be made appropriate to life chances”167 and to prepare
“students for their future social roles.”168 The impetus behind this
change was the development of the industrial economy and the desire
for elites to maintain their place of privilege within the industrial
economy.169
Elitist educational reformers pushed for a more stratified system
of public education with varying skills being taught to different
students, rather than the universal curriculum advocated by the
common school founders.170 The stratified system of education
required students to “climb upward through a sequence of grade
levels and graded institutions and to face an increasing risk of
elimination as they approach the higher levels of the system.”171
Those who were able to navigate their way through the stratified
system of education were able to obtain more credentials, which
allowed them to obtain better jobs and a higher social status.172 This
group of those residing in the U.S., namely white, male landowners.” FRANKENBERG ET AL.,
supra note 124, at 1034.
167. HORLICK, supra note 162, at 3, 10–22.
168. Labaree, Consuming, supra note 154, at 385.
169. HORLICK, supra note 162, at 51–54 (contrasting the views of the common school
founders who believed that universal education was necessary in order to enhance the
intellectual and moral level of all Americans in order to make a make a more effective republic,
with the elitist education reformist of the late 1800s/early 1900s who believed that a social and
cultural elite was necessary to give direction to society. Elitist education reformers believed that
the industrial economy which was characterized by “tremendous capacity for productive output
and frightening confrontations between capital and labor” which lead to high rates of social
mobility. The elites believed that stratification in the skills taught would help them to maintain
their privileged place in society).
170. HORLICK, supra note 162, at 10–22. See also Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163,
at 51 (commenting that “[t]he last thing that a socially mobile educational consumer wants out
of education is the kind of equal educational outcome produced in the name of democratic
equality”).
171. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 52.
172. See Labaree, Consuming, supra note 154, at 390–92 (arguing that elitist education
reformers “turned the common school, where everyone underwent the same educational
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stratified system of education favored (and continues to favor) elites
because of the privileged station from which they began.173
To be sure, these two visions of public education—education for
the health of the democracy and education for purposes of individual
social mobility—are contrasting visions. The view of education as
necessary for the health of the democracy situates education as a
public good—or a good “where benefits are enjoyed by all members
of the community, whether or not they actually contributed to the
production of the good.”174 As a result, the individual social mobility
rationale suggests that education is private property and that
excluding people from consuming it can assist the individual in
differentiating themselves and moving-up the social and class
ladders.
While the democracy and social mobility rationales are
contrasting they have until recently co-existed with one another.175
However, the normative justifications for providing public education
have slowly been re-conceptualized through market-based reforms to
public education such that the vision of public education for social
mobility purposes dominates the vision of public education for the
health of the democracy.176 This shift is explored in the part that
follows.
experience, into the uncommon school where everyone entered the same institution but then
pursued different programs”).
173. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 52 (quoting RUSSELL COLLINS, THE
CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 183
(Academic Press 1979) (“As education has become more available, the children of higher social
classes have increased their schooling in the same proportions as children of the lower social
classes have increased theirs; hence the ratios of relative educational attainment by social
classes [remain] constant.”)).
174. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 51.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Frankenberg & Le, supra note 160, at 1036–37 (“Originally conceived as a
system of ‘common schools’ that teach civics and citizenship and that are supposed to erase
inequality, many now perceive that public schools serve essentially as college prep schools and
the center of elite, merit-based learning that ‘separate the wheat from the chaff,’ and as a means
for private advancement.”); Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 73 (“[T]he increasing
hegemony of the mobility goal and its narrow consumer-based approach to education have led
to the reconceptualization of education as a purely private good.”).
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B. Market-Based Reforms Allow the Social Mobility Justification for
Public Education to Dominate
The social mobility justification for public education suggests that
the purpose of public schools is to “provide students with the
educational credentials they need in order to get ahead.”177 Put
another way, it envisions public education as necessary in order to
provide individuals with a vehicle they can use to obtain economic
security. Though the social mobility justification for public education
has always existed, it became particularly acute and dominant when
the American economy shifted from a manufacturing-based to a
knowledge-based one.178 This is the case because the manufacturing
economy, for the most part, required its workers to possess very
highly specialized skills that were specific to different manufacturing
industries and could be taught on the job.179 As a result, only a
general high school diploma, not a post-secondary education, was
necessary in order to obtain a well-paying job that would allow a
person to maintain a middle-class lifestyle.180
In the new knowledge-based economy on the other hand,
“knowledge is a commodity that when exploited can reap tangible
benefits upon the possessor.”181 In particular, the kind of knowledge
that is necessary in order to obtain most jobs, particularly well-paying
ones, in the new knowledge-based economy is a college or advanced
degree.182 To that end, the number of people with at least some
177. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 50.
178. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, REVISITED
(2012) (arguing that a creative class composed of scientists, technologists, innovators and other
knowledge based professionals had become the central force in the American economy
propelling economic growth).
179. ANTHONY CARNEVALE & DONNA DESROCHERS, OFFICE OF VOCATIONAL AND ADULT
EDUC., THE MISSING MIDDLE: ALIGNING EDUCATION AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 1 (Apr.
4, 2002), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED465092.pdf.
180. Id. at 5 (describing the types of and availability of jobs in the manufacturing-based
economy and noting that during that time period “people could start at the bottom and, without
much formal education, work their way to the top” without much formal education).
181. Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary”: Protecting Students and Taxpayers
Through Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 729,
744 (2010).
182. CARNEVALE & DESROCHERS, supra note 179, at 6 (describing the change in the
education level required to obtain a job in the knowledge based economy and noting that the bar
is set particularly high with most jobs requiring some college or a bachelor’s degree).
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college or a college degree has increased substantially.183 As a result,
it is becoming increasingly important in the new knowledge based
economy for individuals to not only have college experience or a
degree, but to obtain that degree from a highly regarded college or
university.184 This has in turn led to college admission at all levels,
but especially the most elite colleges, becoming increasingly
competitive.185
The aforementioned shift in the kinds of education necessary to
obtain economic security and social mobility in the new knowledgebased economy is having a profound impact on elementary and
secondary public education in America. Indeed, because of the
importance of a college degree to the new knowledge-based
economy, public elementary and secondary schools are increasingly
conceptualized as necessary launching pads to help students get into
the best colleges and universities.186 As a result, not all public schools
are created equally; rather there is intentional stratification amongst
public schools.
183. Catherine Rampell, Data Reveal a Rise in College Degrees Among Americans, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/education/a-sharp-rise-in-americanswith-college-degrees.html?_r=0 (noting the increasing number of Americans with a college
degree and finding that “college attendance has increased in the past decade partly because of
the new types of jobs that have been created in the digital age, which have increased the wage
gap between degree holders and everyone else”).
184. See Kevin Carey, Gaps in Earnings Stand Out in Release of College Data, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/upshot/gaps-in-alumni-earningsstand-out-in-release-of-college-data.html (finding that “students who enroll in wealthy, elite
colleges earn more than those who do not”); Jordan Weissmann, Does It Matter Where You go
to College?, THE ATLANTIC (May 17, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2012/05/does-it-matter-where-you-go-to-college/257227/ (analyzing data showing a correlation
between college and prestige and future earnings).
185. Nick Anderson, Ivy League Admission Rate: 8-Point-Something Percent, WASH.
POST. (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/the-ivy-leagueadmission-rate-8-point-something-something-percent/2014/03/28/558400de-b67e-11e3-8cc3d4bf596577eb_story.html (reporting that the admission rate for the elite Ivy League schools
was approximately 8.9%).
186. While the subject of this Article is public schools, private schools also play a role in
conceptualizing the purpose of education more broadly as being for social mobility purposes. In
fact, affluent students who do not attend well-regarded public schools instead attend private
elementary and secondary schools that have selective admissions processes and charge tuition
rates that approximate or rival the tuition rate at selective colleges. See generally Anna Bahr,
When Getting Into College Starts at 3, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/07/30/upshot/when-the-college-admissions-battle-starts-at-age-3.html.
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Stratification is not only deemed appropriate but necessary if the
purpose of public education is conceptualized as providing students
with the credentials they need to “get ahead” in the knowledge based
economy. When social mobility is the primary goal of public
education “[t]he benefits of education are understood to be selective
and differential rather than collective and equal.”187 That leads to
public education being “structured in such a manner that the social
benefits of education are allocated differently, with some students
receiving more than others.”188 Put another way, schools are
differentiated so that some students will be able to obtain an
education that sets them apart from others and gives them a credential
that makes them more attractive than another student, particularly in
the quest for admission to selective colleges.
Market-based reforms exploit this differentiated system of
education by requiring students to fight for admittance into the
limited number of quality charter, magnet schools or voucher
programs and not enacting reforms to schools that improve all
schools. For poor and minority students who are often locked into
neighborhoods where the traditional public schools are low quality,
market-based reforms do not offer a meaningful opportunity for the
majority of such students to obtain a quality education. Yet, they are
allowed to serve as the predominate form of public school reform
because we now conceptualize public education as a private rather
than public good that is primarily necessary for social mobility
purposes. To that end, there must be winners and losers in the race
for quality public education. Given the vulnerable status of poor and
minority students, they often become the losers. To be sure, marketbased reforms are not all bad and should not be discounted altogether.
However, they must not be permitted to remain the sole basis of
public school reform. The part that follows outlines important public
school reform alternatives that could be enacted along with marketbased reforms in order to shift public education back to being a
public good.
187. Labaree, Public Goods, supra note 163, at 51.
188. Id. at 52.
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IV. EXPANDING THE REFORM AGENDA: ALTERNATIVES TO MARKETBASED REFORMS
The decline of judicially-based remedies as a means of improving
educational opportunities for poor and minority students is
understandable given the limitations discussed in Part I. However, the
saturation of the reform agenda with primarily market-based reforms
is misguided. The primarily market-based reform agenda has a
detrimental impact on the educational opportunities available to poor
and minority student because it results in a quality education being
conceptualized as a private good. As with most private goods, the
most vulnerable members of society—in this case poor and minority
students—have a difficult time obtaining it. Given the positive
externalities associated with a quality public education, it is important
that measures be taken to ensure that a quality public education
remains a public, not a private good. To that end, this part provides a
non-exhaustive summary of two expansive potential reforms that
could be enacted in greater scope alongside market-based reforms in
order to ensure that a quality public education remains a public good.
First, a primary reason that poor and minority students are unable
to obtain access to a quality education is because residence is linked
with school assignment.189 Market-based reforms change this
paradigm for a shallow subset of poor and minority students who are
able to use the reforms to get into a quality school outside of their
neighborhood school. The limited scope of these reforms, however,
makes them an insufficient reform remedy. An alternative reform
measure would be to enact reforms that allow for more inter-district
mobility. Because of the high levels of racial and economic
segregation between districts, and the harms associated with racially
and economically segregated schools, reform that tightly links school
attendance with residence is critical. Enacting some forms of
regionalism in public school assignments would help to dislodge the
current monopoly that more affluent and typically white students
have on quality public education.190
189. Wilson, Leveling Localism, supra note 8, at 645–49; Aaron Saiger, The School
District Boundary Line Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 501–07 (2010).
190. See Wilson, Regionalism, supra note 39, at 1465–68 (describing successful forms of
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In addition to regionalism, another type of reform that could be
enacted to lessen the connection between residence and school
attendance is controlled choice. Controlled choice is a system of
school assignment in which “rather than assign[ing] students to a
zoned neighborhood school, controlled choice allows parents to rank
their school preferences across a district—and then uses a computer
algorithm to balance those choices to achieve a diverse mix of
students in each school.”191 Successful controlled choice programs
have been enacted in places like Wake County, North Carolina;
Cambridge, Massachusetts; and San Francisco, California.192
Enacting programs that delink residence from school attendance
through regionalism or controlled choice would broaden the ability of
all children to obtain a quality public education thereby situating a
quality public education closer to that of a public rather than private
good.
Second, as other scholars have noted, most low-performing
schools in urban areas are low-performing because, among other
things, students and their families are dealing with a plethora of nonschool issues that make learning difficult.193 A better alternative
might be to replace low-performing schools with Community Based
Schools (CBS). CBSs are schools that partner with other public
service providers to provide not just educational services, but also
much needed support to distressed communities in areas such as
health care, counseling, adult education, and cultural events.194 For
regionalist education governance structures that have been enacted); ORFIELD &
FRANKENBERG, supra note 25, at 35 (arguing for expansion of regionalism in public education
as a reform that would vastly improve educational opportunities for poor and minority
students).
191. Brad Lander & Ritchie Torres, What Would It Take to Integrate Our Schools, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/opinion/what-would-it-take-tointegrate-our-schools.html?_r=0.
192. See Eric Schulzke, ‘Controlled Choice’: Does Mixing Kids Based on Family Income
Improve Education, DESERT NAT’L NEWS (Apr. 10, 2014), http://national.deseretnews.com/
article/1265/controlled-choice-does-mixing-kids-based-on-family-income-improve-education.
html.
193. See, e.g., Black, Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1759–60.
194. See, e.g., What Is a Community School?, COALITION FOR COMMUNITY SCHS.
http://www.communityschools.org/aboutschools/what_is_a_community_school.aspx
(last
visited Nov. 5, 2015) (describing community schools as a “place and set of partnerships
between the school and other community resources” and noting that community schools “bring
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example, in Cincinnati, Ohio, the Cincinnati School District
revamped its failing schools with CBSs called “community learning
centers.”195 The community learning centers in Cincinnati have
shown modest but important progress. Improved graduation rates, test
scores, attendance, and community revitalization have been a
hallmark of the community learning center expansion in
Cincinnati.196 Some forms of CBSs have been successfully
implemented in other high poverty urban school systems.197 A reform
agenda that includes CBSs would assist in re-conceptualizing a
quality public education as a public good rather than a private good.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that market-based reforms as the primary
method of reforming schools for poor and minority students situates a
quality education as a private good rather than a public good. It
suggests that they do so through their emphasis on the individual
rather than collective benefits of public education and by putting the
onus on individual parents and students rather than the state to
provide a quality education. It further suggests that the enactment of
wholesale market-based reforms results in social mobility rather than
democratic values being normatively conceptualized as the primary
together many partners to offer a range of supports and opportunities to children, youth,
families and communities”).
195. Bylaws & Policies § 7500, CINCINNATI CITY SCH. DIST, http://community.cps-k12.
org/sites/boardpolicies/7000%20Property/7500%20Policy%20Community%20Learning%20
Centers.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (“[E]ach school should also be a community learning
center in which a variety of partners shall offer academic programs, enrichment activities, and
support to students, families, and community members before and after school as well as during
the evenings and on weekends throughout the calendar year.”).
196. See Javier C. Hernández, Mayoral Candidates See Cincinnati as a Model for New
York Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/nyregion/
candidates-see-cincinnati-as-model-for-new-york-schools.html?_r=0 (“[A]fter years of poor
performance and an exodus of middle-class families to the suburbs, Cincinnati has made some
of the greatest gains in test scores in Ohio in recent years, even though it lags behind state
averages. School officials here credit the city’s embrace of the community-schools model,
which is now fully in place in 34 of 55 schools in the system.”).
197. Community School—Results that Turn Around Failing Schools: Test Scores,
Attendance, Graduation and College-Going Rates, COALITION FOR COMMUNITY SCHS. 2 (May
2010), http://www.communityschools.org/assets/1/AssetManager/Turning_Around_Schools_
CS_Results2.pdf (describing successful implementation of community schools in New York,
New York; Providence, Rhode Island; and Tukwila, Washington).
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purpose of public education. This results in a stratified system of
public education which is normatively considered appropriate but
operates to the disadvantage of poor and minority students. In order
to re-conceptualize public education as public rather than private
good, the Article proposes enacting reforms that decouple school
attendance from residence through regionalism and controlled choice.
It also proposes enacting reforms such as community-based schools
that actually improve neighborhood schools located in predominately
poor and minority areas. Enacting such reforms, in addition to
market-based reforms, will help to ensure that a quality public
education remains a public rather than private good.

